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Controlling Voices: Intellectual Property,
Humanistic Studies, and the Internet,
TyAnna K. Herrington. Carbondale and
Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois
University Press, 2001. 171 p. $25 paper
(ISBN 0-8093-2373-7) or cloth $50 (ISBN 0-
8093-2372-9)
Author TyAnna Herrington has a law de-
gree and a PhD from Texas Tech and is a
professor in the School of Literature, Com-
munication and Culture at Georgia Tech. I
was intrigued by Herrington’s background
and looked forward to reading a book that
melded copyright and philosophy. Al-
though I can write with a modicum of in-
telligence on copyright issues, my com-
ments about philosophy are much more
tentative.
Herrington raises many important is-
sues in her book, but her writing style is
overly complex and sometimes ponderous.
Her message is that every author builds
on what he or she has read, seen, or heard,
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and sharing knowledge is important for
educators in particular, and for society at
large. The interests of publishers and large
companies usually conflict with those of
teachers and students. It is our country’s
legislative branch, rather than our courts,
that determine public policy. Publishers
and large companies have an inordinately
strong influence on Congress. Therefore,
the academic community must participate
actively in public policy discussions that
address the creation, dissemination, and
use of intellectual property.
Herrington notes that American copy-
right law is founded in our Constitution
(Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8), has been codified by
Congress (the entire Title 17 of the U.S.
Code is devoted to copyright), and is in-
terpreted by the courts. She admirably tries
to simplify and clarify complex issues.
Commentators must balance carefully the
goal of simplification with the need for
fuller disclosure, without getting too com-
plex. Whereas Herrington seems to com-
plicate basic issues when discussing phi-
losophy, she occasionally oversimplifies
the tricky area of copyright law.
For example, in discussing the fair use
provision (section 107) of the 1976 Copy-
right Act, Herrington writes that “the stat-
ute requires that a fair use exception be
applicable in cases in which the use is ‘pro-
ductive,’ ‘resulting in some added benefit
to the public beyond that produced by the
first author’s work,’” (p. 62) and cites Wil-
liam Patry’s The Fair Use Privilege in Copy-
right Law for the latter quote. In fact, the
word “productive” does not appear in sec-
tion 107. Courts, not Congress, introduced
the concept of productive uses, or those
that add something new to the work cop-
ied. Furthermore, courts have blown hot
and cold on this issue. In Sony Corp. v. Uni-
versal City Studios (1984), the Supreme
Court largely discredited the requirement
that a “fair use” be a “productive use.” But
a decade later, the Court spoke in favor of
“transformative” uses in Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music (1994). At any rate, a use need
not always be “productive” for it to be a
“fair use” under section 107, and not all
productive uses will be “fair.”
Herrington’s interpretation of some
court decisions is questionable. For ex-
ample, she writes, “when an unofficial bi-
ographer quoted from J.D. Salinger’s un-
published letters, the court found that the
defendant could not claim a fair use ex-
ception because he used the quotations to
add interest to his work, rather than for
scholarly commentary.” (p. 63) In fact, the
critical aspect of Salinger v. Random House
(2nd Cir. 1987) was that Salinger’s letters
were unpublished, not that they merely
added interest to Ian Hamilton’s biogra-
phy, J.D. Salinger: A Writing Life (Random
House, 1986). Furthermore, in 1992, five
years after the Salinger decision, Congress
amended section 107 by adding the clause:
“that a work is unpublished shall not it-
self bar a finding of fair use if such finding
is made upon consideration of all the above
factors.”
Herrington also occasionally oversim-
plifies the analysis a court must complete
in determining whether a use is fair. For
example, with regard to commercial copy-
ing, citing the 1984 Sony decision above,
she writes “the Supreme Court has created
a specific presumption that all commercial
use is un-fair,” (p. 62), and later “[t]he Su-
preme Court created a bifurcated test for
fair use based on whether the use was com-
mercial or noncommercial in Sony Corp. v.
Universal Studios, Inc.” (p. 75–76). She then
quotes commentator William Patry: “[T]he
court held that ‘every commercial use of
copyrighted material is presumptively an
unfair exploitation of the monopoly privi-
lege that belongs to the owner of copyright
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. . .’” [Patry] (454). The bibliography
Herrington provides at the end of her book
includes only a reference to the second
edition of Patry’s The Fair Use Privilege in
Copyright Law (Bureau of National Affairs,
1995). Herrington’s citation to Patry’s
quote references page 454 of The Fair Use
Privilege. The quotation, however, is not
from the second edition, but rather from
the first edition of Patry’s treatise, pub-
lished a decade earlier (Bureau of National
Affairs, 1985).
This is important, because a decade
after the Sony decision, the Supreme Court
modified its approach to commercial and
non-commercial uses in Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music (1994). In his second edition,
Patry notes this change: “[u]nder Campbell,
the commercial or nonprofit educational
purpose of a work is only one element of
the first factor enquiry into its purpose and
character.” (Patry, The Fair Use Privilege in
Copyright Law, 2nd ed., Bureau of National
Affairs, 1995, p. 429). Patry continues:
“Campbell satisfactorily returns the law of
fair use to its pre-Sony days, consistent
with the statute, the legislative history, and
pre-1976 Act case law. The fact that a use
is commercial or noncommercial is both a
subfactor of the more general inquiry into
the purpose and character of the use; and
but one element of the larger fair use bal-
ancing of all relevant factors.” (Patry, p.
429) Perhaps this level of analysis may not
mean much to many readers, but the facts
are the facts.
Ultimately, readers would be better
served by reading some of the authors
Herrington quotes or includes in her bib-
liography. Perhaps most notable are the
works of L. Ray Patterson, Copyright in
Historical Perspective (Vanderbilt University
Press, 1968), and, with Stanley Lindberg,
The Nature of Copyright: A Law of Users’
Rights (University of Georgia Press, 1991),
which she cites frequently. Contemporary
legal scholars who advocate user rights
include University of California, Berkeley
law professor Pamela Samuelson, and
Stanford’s Lawrence Lessig. For a basic, yet
very sound introduction to copyright law,
readers may want to look at Kenneth
Crews’ Copyright Essentials for Librarians
and Educators, published in 2000 by the
American Library Association.
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